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I.
contends that this Court has determined that I.

§ I

117 is the exclusive source

of attorney fees in this case, and contends that there are at least 14 cases in which this Court has
stated that I.C § 12-117 is exclusive. Respondent's Brief, p. 3. What Sanders fails to
acknowledge is that of the 14 cases she cites (all of which have been previously cited and
summarized by the Board), not one of those cases involves a breach of employment contract like
is at issue in this case. Sanders further ignores the numerous cases that allow attorney fees under

I.C § 12-120(3) where a governmental entity prevails on a breach of contract claim, including
employment claims. See Clark v. State, Dept. of Health & Welfare, 134 Idaho 527, 532, 5 P.3d
988,993 (2000) (allowing attorney fees under I.C § 12-120(3) to the State after prevailing on a
breach of employment contract claim); Willie v. Bel. of Trustees, 138 Idaho 131, 136, 59 P.3d
302,307 (2002) (allowing attorney fees to a school district Board of Trustees when prevailing on
a breach of employment contract claim); Huyett v. Idaho State Univ., 140 Idaho 904, 911, 104
946,

P.3d 11

(2004)

(2011 )

university entitled to attorney

1

under I.e. § [

; Noak v. Idaho Dept. of Correction,

120(3) for

1 P.3d

Plaintiff Sanders argues, in a footnote, that Sadid does not support the contention that I. C § 12-120(3) is
available to the Board, ostensibly because 1. C § 12-117 does not apply to Idaho State
's
Brief, p. 21 (fn. 5) (citing Horne v, Idaho State Univ., 138 Idaho 700, 706, 69 PJd 120, 126 (2003». It should be
noted that Horne was decided in 2003, and § 12-117 was amended in 2010. See 2010 H.B. 421, § 1. As it now reads,
and "political subdivisions". I. C § 12-117( I). A "political subdivision" means
§ 12-117 applies to "state
"a city, a county or any taxing district", and a "state agency" means "any agency as defined in section 67-5201,
Idaho Code." I.C § 12-117(4). The definition for state agency in I.C § 67-5201, a statute which aiso has been
revised since 2003, includes "each state board, commission, department or officer authorized by law to make rules
statutc,
or to determine contested cases." I.e § 67-5201(2). Idaho State University is clearly an entity established
see I.e § 33-3001, and is statutorily given the power to "adopt rules and regulations." I.e § 33-3006(1), The Board
of Trustees ofISU is the State Board of Education. I. C § 33-3003. The State Board of Education certainly fits the
definition of "Agency" in I. C § 67-5201 (and therefore fits the definition of "statc agency" in I. C § 12-117).
does not apply to this present case holds little weight. The result in Sa did
Therefore, Sander's argument that
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703,712 (2012), reh'g denied (Mar. 12,2012) (Idaho Department
under 1.

Corrections awarded fees

§ 1 120(3) for prevailing on contract claim).
While there are numerous cases holding that 1. e. § 12-117 is exclusive to those entities to

which it applies, Sanders can cite to no case holding that, as a matter of law, 1. e. § 12-117 is
exclusive over I.e. § 12-120(3) when there is a breach of contract claim stated in the Complaint.
There is no case which holds so as a matter of law. Further, as mentioned above, there are also
numerous cases allowing fees under 1. e. § 12-120(3) to "political subdivisions

2

"

or "state

agencies}" who prevail on contract claims. In the absence of a case absolutely holding that I. e. §
12-120(3) is unavailable to the Board, and in light of so many similar cases allowing for attorney
fees under I.e. § 12-120(3) to entities which prevail on breach of contract claims (and which
could conceivable fall under the definitions of "state agency" or "political subdivision" in I. e. §
12-117), the Board contends that Judge Norton abused her discretion by refusing to even
consider an award of attorney
none of Sanders'
the Board
ruling on the matter,

under I.e. § 12-120(3). As discussed in more detail below,
to

Judge Norton or require this court to deny
Board requests
"VL'~V;'V

attorney fees to

this Court reverse
case

Board in both the

and in this appeal.

applies to this case because J) Idaho State University is an entity to which I.e. § 12-117 clearly applies, and 2) this
Court did not hold in
that Ie. § 12-117 was not applicable to Idaho State University. Therefore, to the extent
fees were awarded to Idaho State University under I.e. § 12-120(3) for prevailing on a breach of contract claim,
should be awarded to the Board in this case.
§ 12-117.
In Willie, the school district constituted a political subdivision as defined by I.
Tn Noak, the State Department of Corrections fits the definition of a "state agency" (sec I. C § 67-520]), as
it is "an executive department of state government" (see 1. C ~ 20-20 I) with the power to make rules (see I.
§ 20209(4).

e.

e.
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OF
argues that 1.

's Brief, pp.

§ § 1 117 and 12-120(3) conflict.

6.

The essence of her argument is in part that the statutes conflict because they both contain a
"disclaimer that they will apply unless the law provides otherwise." Respondent's Brief, p. 6.
Indeed, both statutes contain the phrase "unless otherwise provided by law" or "unless otherwise
provided by statute"; however, in actually reading the statute, it is clear that these phrases do not
create a conflict.
Before this court can detelmine whether a conflict occurs, the court should attempt to
construe the statutes at issue harmoniously. In Cox v. Mueller, 125 Idaho 734, 874 P.2d 545
(1994), in discussing an apparent conflict between

I.e.

§ 12-120 and

I.e.

§ 5-335, the Supreme

Court stated
Because I.e. § 12-120(1) requires a party to specify the maximum amount of
damages claimed
§ 5-335 forbids a personal injury plaintiff from
claiming a specific amount of damages, the two statutes admittedly are difficult to
reconcile. However, it axiomatic that this Court must assume that whenever
legislature enacts a
it
in mind previous statutes relati
to
Com;truction, § 51.02
1.
matter.
or amendment,
new prOVIsIon IS
embodied in
prior statutes.
same subject, although in apparent
statutes
in harmony if reasonably possible.
; Sampson v. Lavton,
are construed to
Idaho 453, 457, 3
883, 885 (1963)

Cox, 125 Idaho at
construe statutes to
There

As is indicated in Cox,

at

and should attempt to construe statutes

not
harmony.

no need to constme I.e. §§ 12-117 and 1 120 such that they conflict. There are

many reasonable readings of
applicable language of 1.

§1

statutes under which they do not

7 states:
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For example,

(1) Unless othenvise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as adverse
parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the state agency,
political
or
court hearing the proceeding, including on appeal,
shall award the prevailing party reasonable attomey's fees, witness fees and other
reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law.

I.e.

§ 12-117(1) (emphasis added). The phrase "unless otherwise provided by statute" occurs at

the beginning of the sentence, indicating that what is to follow only applies if there is no other
statute providing a different recourse. In this case, the language following "unless otherwise
provided by statute" would be the applicable attomey fee statute if there is no other available
(and applicable) source of attomey fees. The language in

I.e.

§ 12-120(3) reads differently. It

states:
(3) In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill,
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of
goods, wares, merchandise, or serviees and in any commercial transaction unless
othenvise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.

I.e.

§ 12-120(3) (emphasis added). This language generally states that in any contract

attomey fees are to

party (including political

awarded to

are specifically defined to

statute's scope).

specifically limited to certain types of
a list of those actions to which it

(i.e. contract or commercial transactions),
The phrase "unless otherwise provided by law"

the list of categories to which it applies. Therefore, the logical reading of the phrase is that
"unless otherwise provided by law", attorney fees are available when suing on open accounts,
accounts stated, notes, bills, negotiable instruments, etc.
Logically, in the myriad

statutes dealing these specific issues,

legislature could

indicate that attorney fees are not to be awarded on such actions and have neglected
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chosen

not to) modify I.

§ 1 120(3) in order to remove its applicability. For example, the Idaho Wage

Claim Act allows

fees to prevailing plaintiffs.

1.

§ 45-615(2). Though claims

for wages under the Wage Claim Act appear to fall within the scope of I.e. § 12-120(3) (as
failure to pay wages is a breach of an employment or service contract, and thus within the scope
of § 12-120(3», the Wage Claim Act's specific attorney fee statute could easily be seen to limit
an award of attorney fees to plaintiffs only (which is different from the general provisions of I. e.

§ 12-120(3). Similarly, under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (claims under which could
also conceivably fall under the scope of I.e. § 12-120(3»), attorney fees are awarded to plaintiffs
if they prevail, but to defendants only if "the plaintiffs action is spurious or brought for
harassment purposes." I. e. § 48-608(5). Thus, in both of these types of claims which could also
fall under the scope of I.e. § 12-120(3), the statutes do not automatically provide for attorney
fees to the prevailing party in the way that I.e. § 12-120(3) does. The "unless otherwise provided
by law" language included I.

§ 12-120(3) applies only to the type of claim being litigated, not

the parties involved. Therefore,
117

not result in a
plain

Sanders admits that 1.

almost identical phrases in 1. e. § 1 120(3) and l. e. § 1

and the statutes can
of

statutes

be harmonized
in a conclusion that

4

IS

no

§ 12-120(3)

applies, by its own
parties, including individuals such as
Appellee Terri Sanders,
partnerships, associations and political
subdivisions. Undoubtedly, by its
language ... it would provide
a fee
award to prevailing party [sic J who brought suit against a school district or other
political subdivision, as well
to a school district or political subdivision who
prevailed against any other
of party.
4

These statutes should not be
to conflict "merely because an astute mind can devise more than
one interpretation" of them. See }vfatter of' Permit No. 36-7200 in Name of Idaho DepL!2LEgrks &Recreation, 121
Idaho 819, 823, 828 P.2d 848, 852 (1992), abrogated by Verska v. Saint AI12honsus Reg'! il;{ed. (!.!-'-, 151 Idaho 889,
265 P .3d 502 (2011).
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Respondent's Brief, p. 7. In other

the Board, as prevailing party, would be entitled to

attomey fees under I.e. § 1 120(3) if Plaintiff was not trying to limit the applicability of the
statute to school districts. In fact, the only issue which Plaintiff can point to as a conflict is that
the standards for awarding attomey fees under I.e. § 12-120(3) and I.e. § 12-117 are different
(i.e. awards under § 1

120(3) are automatic to the prevailing party, whereas awards under § 1

117 are allowed only when the non-prevailing party brought or defended the case without basis

in lawaI' fact). Respondent's Brie}; p. 7. This argument might create an issue if there were a
source of law stating that both I. e. § § 12-120(3) and 12-117 could not both apply to a single
case, but Sanders cannot point to such authority. In fact, there is no specific holding in any case
which makes such a statement. Plaintiff repeatedly points to Potlatch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch

Sch. Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 226 P.3d 1277 (2010), reh'g denied (Mar. 17,2010), trying to
show that that case holds I.e. §§ 1 120(3) and 1

nothing of the sort Potlatch, and

the same case. However, Potlatch
of l.

discussing the

117 to

§

holds that § 1

as to

1282. This makes sense

UV\.,(LU.)v

117 arc exclusive and may not both apply to

r

§ 1

1. e. § 1 117 and 1.

other case

or other polilical
Idaho at

§ 1 121 have the same standard

determining whether attomey fees are awardable. Because l. e. § 12-120(3)
of cases, it

standard, and applies to

at

5,

a different

may apply alongside 1. C §

117.

e.g., Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v. County ot Kootenai, 151 Idaho 405, 415, 258 P.3d 340, 3
(2011) (no discussion of exclusivity, even though fees were requested under 1.
117,12-120(3), and 1

121); Nation v. State, Dept. o[Correction, 144 Idaho 1

953, 970 (2007) (no discussion of

§§ 9-344, 1
194, 158 P.3d

even though fees were requested under 42 U.s.c.
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§ 1988, and1.C §§ 12-117, 1 120,12-120(3), and 12-121).
In other circumstances, I. C § § 1

and 12-117 have been construed

For example, in Scott Beckstead Real Estate Co. v. City of Preston, 147 Idaho 852, 216 P.3d 141
(2009), the City prevailed on summary judgment against a developer on a claim related to
installation of a water line. Id., 147 Idaho at 853,216 P.3d at 142. With regard to attorney fees,
the Supreme Court stated
After judgment was entered in its favor, the City filed a "Motion for Costs and
Attorney Fees." In its supporting memorandum, it requested an award of attorney
fees under Idaho Code §§ 12-117, 12-120, and 12-121. The district court held
that the City was the prevailing party, but it denied the City's request for an award
of attorney fees. In doing so, it addressed Idaho Code §§ 12-117 and 12-121, but
it did not consider the applicability ofIdaho Code § 12-120.
Idaho Code § 12-120(1) provides that "in any action where the amount pleaded is
twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or less, there shall be taxed and allowed to
the prevailing party, as part of the costs of the action, a reasonable amount to be
fixed by the court as attorney's fees." The amount pleaded in this case was less
than $25,000.

In its motion for attorney fees, the City
§ 12--120, and § 1
21,
"

an award pursuant to "§ 1 117,
its supporting memorandum, it wrote:

§1

5

120(1) provides in any
,000.00 ,
be taxed and allowed to
as part of the costs
action, a reasonable amount to
fixed by
court as attorney's fees."
There is no requirement under § 12-120 that the Court find the Plaintiff
pursued the case frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation, as set
forth in Rule 54(e)(l) I.R.C.P.
requirement applies only to awards of
attorney fees and costs pursuant to § 1 121, Idaho Code. The provisions
of this Section are mandatory....
In its memorandum, the City adequately identified Idaho Code §
120(1) as a
statute under which it was requesting an award of attorney fees. The district court
denied the City~~ request (or an award of attorney fees without considering the
applicability of that statute. In doing so, it erred. The City was entitled to an
That amount is now $35,000, See I.e. § 12-120(1).
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award of attorney fees under that statute.

The City requests an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to [daho Code §§
12-117, 12-120(1), and 12-121. Because the City is the prevailing party on
appeal, it is entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(1).

Scott Beckstead Real Estate Co., 147 Idaho at 856-57, 216 P.3d at 145-46 (emphasis added).
Though Scott Beckstead Real Estate Co. dealt with 1. e. § 12-120( 1) instead of I. e. § 12-120(3),
that does not alter the applicability of its holding to this case. The City of Preston clearly falls
within the definition of "political subdivision" of 1. e. § 12-117 (5)(b), and therefore, under
Sanders' analysis, should only be allowed attorney fees under § 12-117. However, the Supreme
Court, construing 1. e. §§ 12-120 and 12-117 together, held that it was error for the lower court to
refuse a request for attorney fees to the City under I.e. § 12-120 when that section applied. To
apply Sanders' analysis would be to deprive political subdivisions of attorney fees under not only

1.

§ 12-120(3), but also subsections (1), (4), (5), and (6) of that statute. Clearly, this is not the

result intended by the language of the statutes, nor should the Court be eager to read J. e. §§ 1
1

117 in conflict so as to

of any subsection of 1

to

ous

subdivisions.
second important

to be taken from

§ 1 117

cities and other political subdivisions

were truly the exclusive source of attorney
of the type of claim), then

Beckstead case is that if I.

should

looked to I.e. § 1 117(5)6 as the

source for attorney fees in =-=-~==, as opposed to looking at I.e. § 1 120(1).7 I.e. § 12-

At the time Beckstead was handed down, l. C § 12·117(5) and had a limit of
instead of $25,000.
Pursuantto2012IdahoLawsCh.149,1.C § 12-117(5) was renumbered asJ.C § 12-117(6).
7
If J. C. § 12-117 was tmly exclusive, the Beckstead Court should have stated that while the provisions of
l. C. § 12-120(1) were met, the provisions of J. C § 12-120(5) were not met, since the amount plead was less than
$2,500, and should have denied fees under both sections. fnstead, the Court determined that fees were available
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117(5) then (and now, renumbered as I.e. § 12-117(6) allowed that if the amount plead was less
than a certain dollar amount

to satisfy both the

2009, $25,000 now), the person

requirements of I. e. § § 12-120 and 1 117 in order to get fees under I. e. § 12-117. However, the

Beckstead Court did not hold that a person could only get fees under I. e. § 1 117 if a city was a
party to the lawsuit, and instead allowed the City of Preston to get fees under I. e. § l2-120( I ).
This would lead to the conclusion that then, as well as now (since the only language which was
changed under I.e. § 12-117(5) was the dollar amount at question), I.e. §§ 12-117 and 12-120
were not exclusive of each other when both potentially applied to a case. If the Legislature had
wanted to correct the Beckstead opinion to make it understood that J. e. § 12-117 was the only
fee statute allowed when a political subdivision is a party to a case, it had full opportunity to do
so in both 2010 and 2012 when I.e. § 1

8

117 was amended. The legislature did not do so. This

would lead to a conclusion that the Beckstead mling was in line with the Legislature'S
understanding of both I. e. §§

120 and 12-117, and that where § 12-120 applies, a political
may obtain fees under the applicable

subdivision (including cities and school
of § 1
cannot point to a

cuse

states l. e. § 1 117 is

over I.e. § 12-120(3) when a school district or board is a party in a contract lawsuit, it makes
little sense to say that the two statutes conflict. There is no
apply. In this case, both statutes could have applied.
an available souree of attorney fees to the Board,

mle that only one fee statute
thati.

§l

120(3) was not

abused her discretion, and her

under § 12-120(1), regardless of compliance with § 12-11 7(5). Therefore,
their own terms, §§ 12-117 and 12-120
should be deemed to be both available if the situation merits.
8
It also had the full 0ppoliuniiy to remove "the stalc of Idaho or political subdivision thereof' ti"om the
definition of "party" in I. C. § 12-120(3) when that statute was amended in 2012, but did not do so.
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decision should be reversed.

Next, Sanders attempts to confuse the Board's explanation of the applicability of I.e. §§
12-117 and 12-120 to this case by referring to the "bilateral" or "one-sided" nature of the
statutes. See Respondent's Brief, pp. 8 -

10. Sanders' explanation makes the situation

considerably more complex than it needs to be. The Board contends that since there is no case or
rule expressly holding that only one fee statute can apply to any given case, and because I. e. § §
12~117

and 12-120 can be construed harmoniously, both can apply to this case. There are many

cases holding that I. C. § 12-117 applies under certain circumstances (and is exclusive as to other
general attorney fee statutes, such as

[e.

§ 12-121), and many cases holding that attorney fee

awards are allowed to political subdivisions under I. e. § 12-120. Under Sanders' interpretation,
the Court would have to disavow or ovenllie all cases allowing attorney fees to political
subdivisions under any statute other than 1. e. § 1 117.
IS

In a
is nothing in

other

contract case,
two statutes

Board's interpretation, no

I.e. § 1 117 and § 12-120(3) can
causes

to

so repugnant to

must be deemed to conflict.
where an act covers the entire
earlier legislation, is
in itself, and is evidently intended to
the
legislation on
the subject, a later act does not by implication rcpeal an earlier act unless there is
such a clear, manifest, controlling, necessary,
unavoidable, and
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy that the two acts cannot, by a fair
and reasonable construction, be reconciled and
effect or enforced
concurrently .
. . . Nonetheless, a conflict that is merely cosmetic or that relates to anything
than the operative legal concepts is not enough; there must be a clear repugnancy
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between the two provisions.

73

between 1.

2d Statutes § 278. The alleged

§§ 1 120(3) and I

117 (that

both contain the "unless otherwise provided by law" language) is not so manifest or controlling
that this Court need conclude there is an irreconcilable conflict.
However, to the extent that this Court does determine that there is a conflict, the Board
contends that 1. e. § 12-120(3) is still available to the Board as a source of attorney fees under the
circumstances of this case. Sanders and the Board both agree that the appropriate canon of
construction where statutes conflict is that the later or more specific statute should control. See

Johnson v. Boundary Sell. Dist. No. 101, 138 Idaho 331, 335, 63 P.3d 457, 461 (2003);
Mickelsen v. City of Rexburg, 101 Idaho 305, 307, 612 P.2d 542, 544 (1980). Plaintiff would
have this Court conclude that 1. e. § 12-117 is both older and more specific than I. e. § 12-120(3).
The Board contends that this is incorrect.
It is not clear which of the two canons the Court will look at as prevailing (i.e. newer is

more important than more specific, or vice

I.e. § 1

it
§ 1),

I.

§1

\vas

March,

of

12

legislature in 1970

vu,eVL,-,q

[17 was

S.

this is not a case where two statutes are created
decades.

is deceptive. The

but in this case,

ch.

§ 1).

then remain unmodified for
to repeatedly (as Plaintiff

statutes have been amended

since they were enacted. In

both statutes were amended as recently as the

session. During that session,

changes to I.

S.L. 2012,

149, § 1),

§ I

117 became effective in

changes to 1.

See Respondent's Brief, pp. II - 13.
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§ 12-120

effective in July, 2012 (see S.L. 2012, ch. 94).10 Where two statutes are continually reaffirmed
by the legislature by being added to, this canon

less useful, as it

constmction

becomes much more difficult to determine which statute prevails as "the more recent expression
of legislative intent." Mickelsen v. City of Rexburg, 101 Idaho 305, 307, 612 P.2d 542, 544
(1980).
Alternatively, where neither statute is clearly the later statute, the Court looks to the
specificity of the statutes.
Where there is in the same statute a specific provision and also a general one
which in its most comprehensive sense would include matters embraced in the
fonner, the particular provision must control, and the general provision must be
taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the
provisions of the particular provision; additional words of qualification needed to
harmonize a general and a prior special provision in the same statute should be
added to the general provision rather than to the special one. This general rule is
applicable only as an aid in ascertaining and giving effect to the legislative
intent.
Similarly, with respect to a conflict arising between a statute dealing generally
with a subject and another dealing specifically with a certain phase of it, the
SPecific legislation controls in a proper case. Moreover, statutes complete in
to a specific
take
statutes that deal only

more specific than its predecessor.
one
section deals with a subject in general terms
another deals
a
same subject in a more detailed
two should be
harmonized, if possible; but if there is a conflict, the specific section
control
over the general.

Am . .fur.

10

120

§ 161 (emphasis added). Based on

§ 1 120(3) should

Plaintiffs
(see Re:-,pondent's Briel; p. 11), the reaffirmation of and amendments to 1. C. § I
eJlcct in July, 2012, would make it the later statute.
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apply. It is more specific as to the types of cases to which it applies (contracts vs. general cases
political subdi visions) and it is later in
Sanders contends that I.

chapter.

§ 12-117 is more specific than I. e. § 1 120(3), but provides

little support for this contention. See Respondent's Brief, p. 13. Sanders relies on Tomich v. City

of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 394, 400, 901 P.2d 501,507 (1995) to show that I.e. § 12-117 is more
specific than I.e. § 12-120. Respondent's Brief, p. 13. There is no discussion of I.e. § 12-117 nor

I.e. § 12-120 in Tomich. Tomich only holds that I.e. § 6-918A is more specific and newer than
I.e. § 12-121. Tomich, 127 Idaho at 400, 901 P.2d at 507. Interestingly, Tomich says nothing
about the applicability of 1. e. § 12-117, even though a city was involved as a party. I I
Interestingly, Tomich gives insight as to what the Court looks at to determine whether a
statute is more specific. With regard to I.e. §§ 12-121 and 6-918A, the Court stated "To the
extent of any conflict between

I.e. § 12-121

and I.C. § 6-918A, we apply I.C. § 6-918A. It is not

only the later statute, but also a more specific statement of the legislature's intent about the award
of attorney

at 507 (emphasis

in tort claims cases." Tomich, 127 Idaho at 400, 901 P

1.

added).

to this case, 1.

Issue.

was more

§ 6-918A
§ 1

the type of case at

is the more

transactions, as opposed to generally

because it
any case

involving a political subdivision. As the Court has held, I. e. § 12-117 is more specific over I. e.
§ 12-121
the parties .

the later is completely general-§ 12-121 applies to every case, regardless of
or

of claims included. I. e. § 12-117 has the same standard as § 1 121,

II

If the Court adopts Plaintiffs logic that cases involving political subdivisions are limited to fees under I. C.
§ 12-117 only, Tmnicb., like Beehler v. Fremont County, 145 Idaho 656, 658, 182 P.3d 713, 715 (Ct. App. 2008),
wilt
have to be determined to have been overruled by Brown v. City o{Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802,811-12,229
P .3d 1164, 1173-74 (2010) (which holds that 1. C. § 12-117 is exclusive as to 1. C. § 6-91
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but applies to certain parties. I.e. § 1 120(3), on the other hand, applies to a very specific type
casc (contracts, commercial transactions,

. Tomich

'UH,UP"J

that the specificity the Court

looks at is the type of case at issue (tort claims, contract claims, etc.), as opposed to the parties
involved. This is backed up in numerous cases where specific case-based attorney fee statutes
apply over more general ones. See Beehler v. Fremont County, 145 Idaho 656, 658, 182 P.3d
713, 715 (Ct. App. 2008) (I. e. § 6-918A (tort cases involving governmental entities) is exclusive
over I.e. § 12-117 (general cases involving governmental entities)); Henry v. Taylor, 152 Idaho
155,267 P.3d 1270, 1276-78 (2012) (I.e. § 9-344(2) was held to be the exclusive attorney fee
statute in a Public Records Act case, over I. e. §§ 12-121 and 12-117). The Board contends that if
the Court finds

I.e. §§ 12-120 and 12-117 to have irreconcilable conflicts, because I.e. § 12-

120(3) dictates not only which parties it applies to but also what categories of claims (contract,
commercial transaction, etc.), it should be deemed the more specific statute, and the Board
should have been allowed to pursue fees under that statute.

Fi11al1 yT,

, argues that the history of 1. C. §

Respondent's

to
IS

689 (1999)

117 demonstrates the legislature's

pp. 13-

8 P.2d

intent can be ascertained by applying

of grammatical

correct is if

only way that Sanders' argument
Ignores

in I.e. §

There is no

the plain language of I.e. § 12-l20(3), it

of Idaho or political subdivision thereof."
120(3) is not applicable can

by a

a statute.

interpretation of the statute.
12-117 discussing

statement

to "the state
1. e. §

plain language of 1.

§ 1

120(3). This is not a reasonable canon of construction under any circumstance. See Hillside

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF AND RESPONSE TO CROSS APPEAL - 14

Landscape Const.! Inc. v. City o(Lewiston, 151 Idaho 749, 753, 264 P.3d 388, 392 (2011).
contention that the legislative intent

the statute to

exclusive is

determined by its history (as opposed to by its language) is unsupported, and without merit,
particularly where there is no assertion that the statute is ambiguous.
Based on the foregoing, the Board contends that ifthere is a conflict betv/een !. e. § § 12120(3) and 12-117, 12-120(3) is the more specific statute, and should apply over 12-117.
Therefore, Judge Norton abused her discretion by refusing to detennine whether attorney fees
were awardable under that statute.
C.

BECAUSE THE BOARD AND THE DISTRICT ARE DISTINCT LEGAL
ENTITIES,DIFFERENT FEE STATUTES MAY APPLY AND I.e. § 12-117 DOES
NOT APPLY IN THIS SUIT AGAINST THE BOARD.
The Board has argued in the alternative that Sanders missed the mark in arguing that I. C.

§ 12-117 is the only applicable fee statute. The basis for this argument is that Sanders' claims for
breach of contract are against the Board of Trustees of Mountain Home School District (as
opposed to the

itself), which Board is not an entity identified or defined within the scope

I.e. § 1 117.

statute

not apply to this case.

none
First,

as an aside, that the Board did not

below. Respondent's

14 -- i5. Such argument should not

addressing this
time this Court

for disregarding the Board's argument.
addressing arguments made by counsel on

are made for the
Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 1

this argument
Court from
the only
are when such

time in the reply brief or at oral arguments. See
(2005) ("this Court will not consider
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141
raised

first time in

appellant's reply brief."); lvfyers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 508,

95 P.3d 977,

(same); Robbins v. CountvotBlaine, 1

Idaho 113, 1 5,996 P.2d 81 ,

815 (2000) (issues raised for the first time at oral argument are not properly before the Court).
The basis for this logic is that

reviewing court looks only to the initial brief on appeal for the

issues presented because those are the arguments and authority to which the respondent has an
opportunity to respond in the respondent's brief." Suitts, 141 Idaho at 708, 117 P.3d at 122.12 In
this case, Sanders has clearly had the opportunity to respond to the Board's argument (as it is
contained within the Respondent's Brief), and therefore the issue is squarely before the Court.
Second, Sanders argues that this issue is form over substance. Respondenl's Brie}; p. 15.
Unfortunately, this conclusion is incorrect. Sanders ignores the distinction made by Idaho
statutes differentiating between the Board as an entity (governed by Chapter 5, Title 33, rdaho
Code) and school districts as entities (governed by Chapter 3, Title 33, Idaho Code). Sanders
attempts to show that her employment contract was between herself and the Board of Trustees by
citing to

127 Idaho 11
's

Brief, p. 15.

this
between a teacher and a
of Trustees", as

fails to

898

( 1(95).

a

nothing as to

an

contract

district is "as a matter of law, between [the teacher] and
have the Court believe. Respondent's

12

p. 15.

It is clear that the Court will refuse to address new issues which have not been heard by the trial court. For
example, a person may not raise new affirmative defense on appeal. See, e.g. :=..o~,-,,~~=--,-,-,c.:..=~~~~~~
Planning & Zoning, 150 Idaho 23 I,
245 P.3d 983, 988 (2010) (a party may not raise a due process issue before
the appellate COUlt if that
never raised the issue before the trial court); Haves~,-State, 146 [daho
357, 195
P.3d 712, 716 (Ct. App. 2008) ([n criminal eases, issues not addressed to the trial court will not be addressed by the
appellate court). These situations do not apply to this case, because the issue of attorney fees was squarely
to the District Court, and this appeal is dealing with Judge Norton's denial of attorney fees to the Board under I. C §
12-120(3).
the Board may
each and every reason why it considers Judge Norton's ruling to be an
abuse of discretion.
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lssues

III

Brown involved whether a particular board of trustees complied with a statute and
an assistant superintendent had authority to enter an oral employment contract with a

potential employee. Brown, 127 Idaho at 115 - 18. Neither of these issues resulted in a
discussion of whether a Board of Trustees can have an employment contract with a teacher, nor
do they relate to this case.
Statutory law is clear on this subject. The Board of Trustees makes the decision whether
to enter the contract. 1. C. § 33-5 I3(1). However, there must be a written employment contract in
a fonn approved by the state superintendent

o~public

instruction. Id. Every written teacher's

contract, including Sanders' contracts, contains essentially the following language:
THIS CONTRACT, made this
day of _ _ year of _ _ , by and between
School District No.
, [daho ("the
("the Teacher").
District"), and
WITNESSETH:
1.
The District hereby employs the Teacher pursuant to Section 33l3
514(2)(a), Idaho Code, for the duration of the
school year ...
The applicable language in Sanders' employment contract states, almost identically, as fol

WITNESSETH:
1.
The District hereby
the Teacher pursuant to Idaho
for the
the 2007/2008 school year....
13

§ 33-515

This language is copied from the form teacher's contract prepared by the Idaho State Department of
Education, with blanks intact. All teacher's contracts are available on the Idaho State Department of Education
2012). The
website. See http://www.sde.idaho.gov/site/educatorresources/contracts.htm (last checked Sept.
Court may take judicial notiee of these
as they are generally known and statutorily required within this
Court's jurisdiction, and are
of accurate and ready determination, as they are from a source (i.e. thc State
Department of Education) whose accuracy cannot readily be questioned. See
111 Idaho 692, 700
(Idaho Ct. App. 1986) (overruled on other grounds Swo~ SWOP/fl, 112 Idaho 974, 982 (1987). See also =c==-~
Doe, 146 Idaho
389, 195 P.3d 745, 748 eCt. App. 2008) (the court allowed judicial notice to be taken of a city
325,420 P.2d 805,808 (1966) (acts of legislature must be
ordinance); City of Lewiston v. Frary, 91 Idaho
given judicial notice, citing to l. C. § 9-101).
L
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It is clear from the statute, and from the language of the contract itself, that Sanders was

employed by the Mountain Home School District, not the Board. Though the Board may make
employment decisions, the District is the separate and distinct entity which employs the teachers.
Sanders also relies on Thomas v. State, 16 Idaho 81, 100 P. 761 (1909) in support of her
argument, stating that "this Court has recognized that an action brought against a board of
trustees of a school district is an action against the state through its political subdivision."

Respondent's Brief, p. 15. Thomas does not say this, nor does it in any way hold that suing a
board is the same thing as suing the entity itself. The issue in Thomas was not whether suing the
board was the same as suing the entity, but whether suing the board was the same thing as suing
the state, an issue which is completely irrelevant to this case. First, as the Court recognized in

Thomas, the specific Board being sued was for the Albion State Normal School, an entity whose
specific statutory creation made it such that a suit could be brought against the State itself when
the Albion Board allegedly breached a contract. Thomas, 100 P. at 762 - 63. Therefore, only
because the
State

statutes

Albion State Normal School

for

the

the school could be a suit

Frankly, this wasn't even the

Thomas. The essential question was

district court

jurisdiction to hear the case (as it was a case against

answered

as

state.

and the Supreme

the State, at that time, must have

brought in

the Supreme Court. ld. at 762. 14

the statutes which created

create other school districts in this

therefore this specific mling docs not establish

Albion School do not

14

This determination was later overruled. See Grant Const. Co. v. Burns, 92 Idaho 408, 413, 443 P.2e!
1010 (1968).
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all suits against school boards are suits against the State itself.
A second issue with the Thomas case is that even if Sanders is correct that Thomas does
apply, and this Court agrees that suing the Board is the same as suing the
Norton still improperly denied fees under

I.e.

§ 12-120(3). By its terms,

15,

I.e.

then Judge

§ 1 117 only

applies to actions involving "as adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a
person." 1. e. § 12-117(1). Neither "political subdivision" nor "state agency" is defined to include
the State ofIdaho itself. See

I.e.

§§ 12-1 17(5)(b) and (5)(d);

I.e.

§ 67-5201. On the other hand,

1. e. § 12-120(3) quite specifically includes the "the state of Idaho or political subdivision
thereof' in the definition of a party. Therefore, utilizing Sanders' own argument, if Thomas
stands for the proposition that a suit against a school board for breach of contract is the same as a
suit against the state for breach of contract, then the proper attorney fee statute is 1. e. § 12120(3), and Judge Norton committed a breach of discretion by refusing to allow fees under the
appropriate statute.
Though Sanders

that numerous other cases show that suits against the governing

body of a political subdivision arc
itself, Sanders cannot
must be treated as the same

trA<lt,,·rj

as if

one case or statute
for all

were a

against
a school

a schoo 1district

and purposes, including attorney

statutes.

This is because there is no such case. The statutes make it clear that the two entities (the Board
and the district) are distinct. Sanders could
breach of her employment contract 16 as it was

sued the Mountain Home School
employer, but she did not do so.

15

for
she

Since Thomas. did not hold that suing a Board is the same thing as suing the entity itself, the only issue
which would be relevant would be what attorney fee statutes are available if suing the Board was the same as suing
the State itself.
16
See I. C. § 33-301 (School districts may sue or be sued).

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF AND RESPONSE TO CROSS APPEAL - 19

is not suing a political subdivision or state agency, and 1. e. § 12-117 does not apply. The
applicable attorney

statute is 1. e. § 1

20(3), and the Board requests that

Court

determine that Judge Norton abused her discretion in determining otherwise.

THE BOARD DID NOT APPEAL JUDGE NORTON'S RULING THAT FEES
WERE NOT ALLOWED UNDER IDAHO CODE § 12-117.
In her brief, Sanders argues that this Court should affirm the "District Court's factual
finding that Plaintiff Sanders' case had a reasonable basis in fact and law." Respondent's Brief,
pp. 16

17. The logic behind this argument appears to be that attorney fees can only be awarded

under 1. e. § 12-117 if the Court is left with a belief that the "nonprevailing party acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law." I.e. § 12-117(1). However, the Board has never challenged nor
appealed Judge Norton's determination that fees were not available under 1. e. § 12-117. See

Appellant's Brief, p. 5 (identifying that the issues on appeal are only whether 1. e. § 12-120(3) is
available to the Board under the circumstances of this case, and whether I.e. § 12-117 is the
exclusive source of attorney fees where the claim at issue is a breach of employment contract
claim). Because the
decision in denying attorney

has never

this Court reconsider
f.

§ I

11

Sanders' request that the

s

a

such finding is moot.

The Board has requested attorney fees
request in any way (except to ask for attorney

appeal. Sanders has failed to respond to
herself upon appeal). Other than pointing out

that the same counsel who worked on this present case also appeared before this

Eotlatch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch Sch. Dist. No. 285, 1

111

Idaho 630, 226 P.3d 1277 (2010), reh'g
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denied (Mar. 17, 2010)17, Sanders has failed to in any way address most of the Board's
By the same logic, Sanders' counsel was the same counsel who appeared in Willie v.
Ed. o(Trustees, 138 Idaho 131, 132,59 P.3d 302,303 (2002)18, and should be intimately aware

of the ruling in that case (and also aware that Willie was in no way discussed in or explicitly
overruled by Potlatch). Therefore, to the extent that Willie is still good law (it has been recently
cited as good law and has never been explicitly overruled), Sanders has no reasonable argument
that the Board should not be awarded fees on appeal under

I.e.

§ 12-120(3). Further, to the

extent that the Board is a party to this action (as opposed to the District itself), there was no
reasonable basis in la'll to argue that it cannot obtain attorney fees tInder I.C. § 12-120(3).

Finally, to the extent that Sanders in no way responded to the Board's request for attorney
fees, she has waived any argument to the contrary. See Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292, 298, 92
P.3d 542, 548 (Ct. App. 2004) ("A party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or
argument is lacking."). Therefore, the Board requests that it be granted attorney fees on appeal.

statement of the case,
a number of statements. Sanders makes a number
misleading. For example, Sanders states that

contentions m her brief that are

no claim in the Complaint

to the

grievance process." Respondent's Brief, p. 1. While this statement is correct, it fails to
acknowledge that even though Sanders did not include a claim in the Complaint related to

17

See Respondent's Brief, p. 21.
John Rumel argued before the Supreme Court in the Willie case. Mr. Rumel also argued Potlatch. He was
the attorney of record in this case as well, until he substituted out and was replaced by Paul Stark in June, 20 II. R.
Vo!. I (Register of Actions).
18
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alleged deficiencies in the grievance process, the Board was still obligated to defend
claims. In Sanders' Motion for Summary

she argued "that the Board

such
to

consider and resolve her grievance." R. Vol. I, p. 32. Judge Greenwood addressed this issue (and
denied this claim), noting that the "Defendants strenuously object to injecting the issue of failure
to follow the grievance process." R. Vol. 1, p. 32. Thus, even though Sanders failed to include in
the Complaint a claim related to the grievance process (which grievance process included the
non-binding arbitration), the Board was obligated to defend such a claim. See R. Vol. 1, p. 32.
Therefore, there can hardly be an implication that the issue of the grievance process was not
raised before the District Court.
Next, Sanders contends that the District "claimed it was asking for only half of its
arbitration costs." Respondent's Brief, p. 2. The record is clear that the Board only sought its
costs from the non-binding arbitration as discretionary costs pursuant to 1.R. CP. 54. See R. Vol.
1, pp. 63, 102. This amount was $2,304.50, which is what Judge Norton awarded as discretionary

costs. R. Vol. 1,

143.
by

it should be noted

Board,
the

arbitration, was a
and the Mountain Home Education Association.
15). Had the Board failed to

's Record Exhibits,

102 (p.

in the non-binding arbitration, there is little doubt but that

would have been facing an explicit claim for violation

In seeking the arbitration costs paid by

grIevance

Board related to
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the Board

only sought to recoup the half of the arbitrator's total bill which the Board was responsible for
paying and did pay. R. Vol. I, pp.

(showing that the Board's total portion of the

arbitrator's bill was $2,304.50). Sanders alleges that the District Court "found, contrary to the
evidence, that the District had paid $4,609.00 and ordered payment of what it believed to be onchalf of the amount paid by the District." Respondent's Brief, p. 2. This appears to be correct. The
Order Granting Costs and Denying Attomey Fees states "The affidavit of costs reveals that the
School District paid total arbitration costs of $4,609.00 so the court will award half of that
amount, or $2,304.50 as discretionary costs." R. Vol. I, p. 139. In finding this, Judge Norton
appears to have mistakenly concluded that the Board paid for the entire arbitration, and was just
seeking to recoup half of those fees. If this is the basis for Judge Norton's finding, then the Board
has no option but to agree that Judge Norton's ruling on this issue should be reversed and
remanded so that the parties may correct her mistaken assumptions and allow her to again
detennine whether the arbitration costs are discretionary costs.
That being said, just because Judge Norton awarded the arbitration costs on a mistaken
not mean
that

the

as discretionary costs.

costs cannot

because

costs related to

Respondent's Brief, p. 18. There

dealt with as directed by the Uniform Arbitration Act.
arc two problems with this argument.

first,

must have

most

is that the Uniform

Arbitration Act does not apply to this case. The act specifically states that "This act does not
to arbitration agreements between employers and employees or between
representatives (unless

provided in the

" I.C §

respective

1. There is little doubt

the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Mountain Home School District and the
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Mountain Home Education Association, which contains the arbitration requirements, constitutes
an "arbitration agreement[] between

or between their respective

and

representatives." See Clerk's Record Exhibits, 102 (pp. 15 - 16). There is nothing in the
arbitration clauses in the Collective Bargaining Agreement indicating that it is to be governed by
the Uniform Arbitration Act. !d. Therefore, all of Sander's arguments based upon the Unifonn
Arbitration Act are without foundation.
Second, to the extent that Sanders relies on 1. C. § 7-91O and Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Ins.

Co., 128 Idaho 398, 403, 913 P.2d 1168, 1173 (1996), such authority is inapposite. Even if the
Uniform Arbitration Act were to be applied to this case, neiiher the Board nor Sanders could
have obtained an award of costs from the arbitrator. Under the terms of the arbitration
agreement, "The arbitrator's recommendation shall be advisory and made to the Board of
Trustees of School District 193 and the grievant." Clerk's Record ~xhibits, 102 (p. 16) (emphasis
added). Even if the arbitrator had awarded costs or fees, it would not have been binding.
Therefore, the oniy way arbitration costs could be allowed in this case would be as part of the

has, in
those stated by

past, affirmed a

011

District Judge. See Martel v. BuloUi, 138 Idaho

("This Court may uphold decisions on alternate
of

and

oflaw on appeal."). The Board

the exceptional nature of
to award

1,

65 P.3d 192, 194

those stated in the findings
and still contends, that due to
is a possible basis for the

non-binding arbitration
arbitration

different grounds

as discretionary costs pursuant to I. R. CP.

54( d)(1 )(D). Pursuant to that section, the costs were

llv'JLv"(H

arbitration was requested by
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Sanders, and therefore the District had to comply), reasonable (the Board only seeks the amount
it paid, which is

$2,500 for a full day arbitration), exceptional (had

Board not engaged

in the non-binding arbitration, it would have been sued for violation of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement), and "should in the interest of justice be assessed against" Sanders. IR. c.P.
54(d)(l)(D). See also R. Vol. J, pp 104 - 05, 126 - 27. Therefore, the Board requests that if this
Court does not see fit to affinn the award of arbitration fees as discretionary costs on the grounds
stated herein, that the Court return the issue to Judge Norton to allow for "express findings as to
why [the] discretionary costs should or should not be allowed." Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v.

Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314,109 P.3d 161,168 (2005).
To that end, there is no basis (as Sanders would have this Court conclude) to deny the
request for discretionary costs outright. As discussed above, such award would not be barred by
the Unifonn Arbitration Act since the arbitration agreement at issue is not covered by the act.
Further, neither I
arbitration

§ 12-101 nor J.R.C.P. 54(d) forbid an award of costs for a non-binding

by

CP. 54(d) says

(i

at the qualities of the costs to

J.R.CP
proceeding"
(such as
the alleged

costs

can or cannot

about

can

f1Pl"PrtYl

1)(0». Further, there is no definition in I

§

J

non-binding arbitration).

[t

was Sanders

of the grievance procedure

steps to a lawsuit
who attempted to interject

the lawsuit

I, p. 32.

see

101 as to what a "civil trial or

such term(s) could easily be construed to include

was contained in the Complaint). See R.
attempt to

be awarded as allowed

lead to a lawsuit. 1. C § 12-101 only states that costs

though no such claim

Sanders should not

the costs that resulted from her actions.
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able to

Plaintiff Sanders contends that she is entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.

§

117. Respondent's Brief, p. 21. This is incorrect for two reasons. First, under the plain
language of I.e. § 12-117, attorney fees are only allowed to the prevailing party. I.e. § 12117(1). Plaintiff Sanders in no way can be considered the prevailing party, as judgment was
entered on behalf of the Board, and Plaintiff Sanders has obtained no relief which she has sought.
Second, under I. e. § 12-117 attorney fees may only be awarded if the Court "finds that
h
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Board contends that there is significant basis for its arguments. Though (as Sanders points out
repeatedly) there are numerous cases holding that I. e. § 12-117 is exclusive to those entities to
which it applies, none of those cases specifically holds that I. e. § 12-117 is exclusive over 1. e. §
120. There are at least five case allowing attorney fees in contract cases to governmental
entities under 1.

§ 1 120(3).19 At least two of these cases have been decided in the iast twelve
supra.

==~""-'-"~==.~-=-'-:'~~~=

City under 1.
Based on

147 Idaho 852,216 P.3d 141 (2009) (allowing attorney

apparent conflict, there is sufficient basis for the Board to argue that it is

e.

§ 12-120 to prevent the conclusion that the Board's argument

is "without a reasonable basis in fact or

See Clark;,

to

§ 1 120(1)).

entitled to attorney fees under

19

have had other

addition, various political

Huvett, Sadid, and

" City of Osburn v. Randel, 1

Idaho 906, 910, 277

supra.
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PJd 353, 357 (2012). Therefore, the Board contends that Sanders has not adequately shown that
the Board's

for fees pursuant to I. e. § 12-1

foundation,

is unreasonable or

and Sanders should not be granted attorney fees on appeal.

Based on the foregoing, the Board requests that this Court reverse Judge Norton's
decision to disallow fees under I.e. § 12-120(3). Also, as there has been no objection to the
reasonableness of the requested fees, the Board also requests that this Court allow fees in the
requested amount, and also allow reasonable attorney fees on appeal. Finally, the Board agrees

'with Sanders' contention that Judge Norton awarded arbitration costs as discretionary costs on a
mistaken premise, and requests that this Court return the issue to Judge Norton to detennine
whether such costs are available under the facts of this case.
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this

day of October, 2012.
ANDERSON, JULIAN &

Brian
Attorneys for
Respondent
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